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Abstract—Security can be seen as an optimisation objective in
NoC resource management, and as such poses trade-offs against
other objectives such as real-time schedulability. In this paper,
we show how to increase NoC resilience against a concrete type
of security attack, named side-channel attack, which exploit the
correlation between specific non-functional properties (such as
packet latencies and routes, in the case of NoCs) to infer the
functional behaviour of secure applications. For instance, the
transmission of a packet over a given link of the NoC may hint
on a cache miss, which can be used by an attacker to guess specific
parts of a secret cryptographic key, effectively weakening it.
We therefore propose packet route randomisation as a mech-
anism to increase NoC resilience against side-channel attacks,
focusing specifically on the potential impact of such an approach
upon hard real-time systems, where schedulability is a vital de-
sign requirement. Using an evolutionary optimisation approach,
we show how to effectively apply route randomisation in such
a way that it can increase NoC security while controlling its
impact on hard real-time performance guarantees. Extensive
experimental evidence based on analytical and simulation models
supports our findings.
I. INTRODUCTION
The design of Network-on-Chip (NoC) interconnects for
embedded systems requires the careful balance of multiple
trade-offs. Over the past decades, a significant amount of work
has addressed the trade-offs between performance and other
secondary objectives such as energy [29], fault-tolerance [19],
and chip area [18]. Less work has addressed such trade-
offs in NoCs with hard real-time constraints, with some
inroads towards improving energy [20] and area efficiency (by
optimising buffering in virtual channels [15]) while meeting
deadlines of all packets even in the worst-case scenario.
In this paper, we consider NoCs with hard real-time con-
straints, and address a novel trade-off that has increasing
importance in embedded systems: security. Because of their
key role in interconnecting the multiple components of an
embedded system, NoCs can be seen as a major security vul-
nerability. If an attacker can extract information from the NoC
interconnect, they can potentially compromise the security of
the complete embedded system. Therefore, many mechanisms
have been designed to improve NoC security (as reviewed in
Section II) and many more will certainly be developed in the
coming years. However, most of such mechanisms impose per-
formance overheads, and therefore can potentially jeopardise
the ability of the NoC to provide real-time guarantees. So we
argue in this paper that, just like in the previously mentioned
trade-offs, security can be seen as an optimisation objective in
NoC resource management: designers must carefully consider
the resources they have available to increase NoC security
without sacrificing performance guarantees (which in the case
of hard real-time NoCs will always be the primary objective).
In Section II, we review the most relevant NoC security
mechanisms and the types of attacks they aim to prevent, dis-
cussing their performance overheads and resource usage, and
highlighting the need for the contributions of this paper. Then,
in Section III we provide details on the specific problem we
address in this paper, which is a security mechanism that aims
to improve the NoC resilience to side-channel attacks. Such
attacks try to break a secure system by gathering information
from the system’s timing behaviour, power consumption, tem-
perature or electromagnetic emissions. Just like some of the
related work [30] [22], we address the problem of side channel
attacks by randomising the behaviour of the NoC, aiming
to make it difficult for an attacker to identify patterns and
correlations between the functionality of the system and the
timing, power, temperature and electromagnetic behaviour of
the NoC. As expected, such an approach has a direct impact on
NoC resource usage, and therefore on its real-time guarantees,
so in Section IV we identify techniques that support NoC
designers in improving NoC resilience against side-channel
attacks while still maintaining full system schedulability. The
paper is closed with extensive experimental work based on
schedulability analysis and simulation in Section V, and with
a summary of our findings.
II. RELATED WORK
Multiprocessor embedded systems are target of attacks by
means of malicious hardware or software [5]. Hardware-
based attacks depend on design-time access to the system,
which is then modified in a way that can be exploited during
operation (e.g. by adding hardware able to leak information
by changing chip temperature [9]). Software-based attacks are
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the most common cause of security incidents in such types
of systems [16], and are carried out by malicious software
installed at design time or after deployment.
NoC-based systems have been shown to be vulnerable to a
variety of attacks, both hardware and software-based. Active
NoC attacks, such as code injection [1], malware [6] and
control hijacking [13], or passive NoC attacks, such as side-
channel exploitation, can be used to read sensitive commu-
nications, modify the system behaviour or prevent correct
NoC operation. NoCs are especially vulnerable to side-channel
attacks that exploit traffic interference as timing channels
[31] [22]. The shared nature of NoCs can be exploited by
an attacker to obtain sensitive information. By forcing traffic
collision with sensitive packet flows, an attacker can observe
the throughput variations and infer sensitive data, as shown in
[31] [22] [30].
Security-enhancing mechanisms have been added to NoC
platforms to provide authentication [25], access control [6],
integrity [24], and confidentiality services [23]. By monitoring
and controlling the data exchange inside the chip, NoCs can
detect and avoid attacks.
Firewall-based and crypto-based techniques integrated at the
network interface are the most commonly used approaches
against active NoC attacks over the past decade [6] [2].
Firewalls implement authentication, access control and in-
tegrity services by means of traffic matching with a security
table. Authorized transactions are allowed and injected to the
NoC, otherwise they are denied and thus dropped. Crypto-
based NoCs implement the confidentiality service by creating
a shared secret among the sensitive cores and perform the
encoded data exchange. While achieving desirable security
enhancements, such approaches have an unpredictable impact
upon the performance of the NoC and thus the overall system.
Firewalls and crypto-based NoCs are the state-of-the-art in
NoC security, but they are not able to protect the system
against passive NoC attacks. Randomised arbitration [22],
virtual channel allocation [26] and routing [30] have been
investigated and evaluated as countermeasures against timing
attacks. By randomising the characteristics of sensitive packet
flows, it is possible to break the correlation between the
traffic characteristics (e.g. volume and access patterns) and
the sensitive data thus avoiding information leakage. Among
those mechanisms, random routing has achieved the best levels
of security enhancement with the lowest energy and area
overhead [30]. By spreading sensitive traffic over the NoC, the
spatial distribution makes it harder for compromised cores or
external attackers to gather sufficient side-channel information
to infer correlations with sensitive data.
Similarly to firewalls and crypto-based approaches, the
focus of randomisation approaches is to increase security
and none of the works in the state-of-the-art consider the
performance requirements of the applications. In this paper,
we argue that NoCs supporting real-time applications require
a careful balance of a trade-off between security and perfor-
mance. In most cases, we envisage that the level of security
will be constrained by the NoC’s ability to support attack
countermeasures while at the same time ensuring performance
guarantees to the application.
Thus, the main contributions of this paper are the identi-
fication of a test to evaluate whether performance guarantees
can hold under a specific side-channel attack countermeasure
(namely route randomisation), and a technique that uses that
test to better balance the trade-off between performance guar-
antees, resource usage and security.
III. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
A. Network-on-Chip Architecture
While the contribution of this paper can be applied to a large
variety of NoC architectures, we believe it is easier to explain
it with the help of a concrete architecture. Therefore, we
open this section with the description of such architecture, and
postpone to Section VI the discussion about the applicability
of the proposed approach to other NoC architectures.
We assume a NoC architecture with a 2D-mesh topology
and wormhole switching protocol, because such features are
commonly used in embedded systems for their simplicity and
moderate resource overheads:
• In a 2D-mesh topology, every core is connected to a NoC
switch via a network interface (NI), which is responsible
for packetising and depacketising data, and controlling
the injection of packets into the network. We use the
term core very loosely, so it can mean a processing
core, a memory controller, an I/O controller (e.g. wireless
communication interface) or any other hardware resource
that requires chip-level communication. The regularity of
such a topology is attractive because it simplifies packet
routing, and because it facilitates chip floorplanning,
placement and routing.
• The use of wormhole switching protocols allows packets
to be gradually sent over the NoC in smaller units called
flits. Once a flit is received by a switch, it can be
forwarded to the next switch down the packet route as
long as that switch has sufficient buffering to hold it.
This means that at any given time a packet could have
its flits temporarily stored by multiple switches, so each
of them are not required to hold a complete packet, thus
reducing the overall buffering requirements of the NoC.
There is a downside to this choice of topology and switching
protocol, which is the difficulty in predicting packet latencies.
Since a packet can be simultaneously occupying multiple NoC
buffers and links, there is a significant amount of competition
for resources throughout the NoC at all times. The wide variety
of interference patterns makes it hard to predict how long it
takes for a packet to reach its destination. Different resource
arbitration policies can make such predictions more or less
difficult, especially in the case of hard real-time NoCs when
an upper-bound worst-case latency is needed. Previous work
has considered NoC arbitration based on packet priority [28],
time multiplexing [21] and round robin [3], and has devised
analytical models that can be used to find latency upper-bounds
for packet flows transmitted over such NoCs [12]. Any of
those approaches could be used in this paper, and we chose a
priority-arbitrated NoC because of its ability to provide upper-
bound latency guarantees that are customisable to different
levels of packet urgency while allowing for high NoC link
utilisation [10].
B. Side-channel Attacks and Countermeasures
In this paper, we aim to improve NoC resilience against
side-channel attacks by making it harder for an attacker to
gain information about secure applications running over the
NoC. Side-channel attackers monitor physical, non-functional
characteristics of a NoC implementation (e.g. timing, power
dissipation, temperature, electromagnetic emissions), and try
to identify patterns that can be correlated with functional
characteristics of a secure application (e.g. time to decrypt
a message, length of a private key, location of a private key
on the chip’s distributed memory [22]).
This follows a commonly used approach based on the
randomisation of the information leaking over side channels.
There are many of the components that are not easy to ran-
domise unless one has full control over the NoC design, such
as the arbitration and flow control latencies (which are defined
by the NoC architecture) and the physical characteristics of
the NoC (which are defined by the chip fabrication process).
We consider those approaches to be outside the scope of this
paper and focus instead on approaches that do not require
significant changes on the NoC. Specifically, we focus on the
randomisation of packet routes. By randomly changing the
route of every packet injected into the NoC, we can introduce
random effects to all side-channels of interest, such as packet
timing, energy dissipation, temperature and electromagnetic
emissions. In this paper, we concentrate on a threat model
based on packet timing, as described in the next subsection.
C. Threat Model
In this paper, we assume that the NoC and its interfaces to
the cores are secure. We also assume that secure tasks execute
in secure cores (i.e. cores that do not allow the execution of
unsecured tasks). For this threat model, we assume that the
NoC communicates sensitive information between two secure
tasks, which we refer as the sensitive communication. We
then assume an adversary that has knowledge about the NoC
architecture, about the mapping of secure tasks to (secure)
NoC cores, and is able to gain control of at most two non-
secure NoC cores.
A successfull attack happens when the adversary is able
to infect two cores that can communicate over a route that
intersects with that of the sensitive communication. In that
case, the adversary is able to use one of the infected cores
to inject low priority packets into the NoC towards the
second infected core. The latency interference imposed by the
sensitive communication over the malicious low priority traffic
can provide the attacker with valuable information about the
timing, frequency and volume of the secure communication.
This threat model is not new, and its variations have also
been used in best-effort NoC-based systems by [31] and [26].
The timing nature of the threat is also the same used in hard
real-time uniprocessor systems by [32].
By using a route randomisation approach, it is possible
to prevent the adversary from obtaining accurate information
about the sensitive communication. Because not every packet
of the secure communication will interfere on the malicious
flows injected by the attacker, the information about timing,
frequency and volume they can obtain will be less accurate,
which as a consequence increases the resilience of the NoC
against the threat. There are many ways to introduce route ran-
domisation in NoCs, and we will discuss our design decisions
in subsection IV-A.
Figure 1 shows an example of the described threat model.
It shows an adversary controlling cores F and G, and using a
malicious packet flow (shown as a purple dashed line) to infer
data about a sensitive communication between secure cores C
and E (shown as a red dotted line, representing the case of
a NoC with deterministic XY routing). In the case of a NoC
with randomised routing, all routes between C and E will be
used (red dashed and dotted lines), preventing the adversary
from inspecting the complete sensitive communication.
A 
D 
B 
C 
E 
F G 
Fig. 1: Threat model, and examples of route randomisation
with pseudo-adaptive XY (from A to B) and west-first (from
C to D and C to E) algorithms
D. System Model
To increase NoC resilience against side-channel attacks
while providing hard real-time guarantees to the application
tasks running on it, we must make assumptions about the
application behaviour such as upper-bounds on resource us-
age by every application task and packet. In this paper, we
follow the well-known and widely used sporadic task model,
which makes assumptions about the worst-case execution time
(WCET) of all tasks and their shortest inter-arrival interval (i.e.
their period). Since we are concerned about NoC communi-
cations, we follow an extension of the sporadic task model
that considers that tasks inject packets to the NoC only after
their execution completes, and that the maximum packet size
is known [10].
Thus, a hard real-time application Γ comprises n real-time
tasks Γ ={τ1, τ2, . . . , τn}. Each task τi is a 6-tuple τi = (Ci,
Ti, Di, Ji, Pi, {φi}) indicating respectively its worst case
computation time, period, deadline, release jitter and priority.
The sixth element of the tuple is an extension to the sporadic
task model proposed by [10], and represents the communi-
cation packets sent by τi at the end of its execution. Each
packet φi is defined as a 3-tuple φi = (τd,Zi,Ki) representing
its destination task, size and maximum release jitter. In this
paper, we assume for simplicity that a single packet is released
at the end of each execution of each task, but the contributions
presented here can be generalised for any number of released
packets.
Such applications are executed over a NoC platform like
the one described in subsection III-A above. We model such
a platform as a set of cores Π ={pia, pib, . . . , piz}, a set of
switches Ξ ={ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξm}, and a set of unidirectional links
Λ ={λa1, λ1a, λ12, λ21, . . . , λzm, λmz}. We also model the
mapping of tasks to cores with the function map(τi) = pia.
The routing of packets over the NoC can be modelled by
the function route(pia, pib) = {λa1, λ12, . . . , λmb}, denoting
the subset of Λ used to transfer packets from core pia to
core pib. We can then extend the function map to also
model the mapping of a packet to its route: map(φi) =
route(map(τi),map(τd)).
With the knowledge of the NoC architectural characteristics
such as the latency to cross a link or to route a packet header,
and with the knowledge of the length of a packet’s route (i.e.
its hop count, or |route(pia, pib)| as expressed in [10]), it is
possible to calculate the no-load latency Li of every packet φi:
the time it takes to completely cross the NoC from its source to
destination without any interference or contention from other
packets. For the NoC described in subsection III-A, and for
most commercial and academic NoCs, the no-load latency of a
packet can be deterministically obtained, and will not change
if its route and the NoC operation frequency do not change.
IV. NOC ROUTING RANDOMISATION
A. Design Choices and Constraints
There are many design choices related to packet routing in
different NoC architectures [17]. As expected, those choices
also define whether and how route randomisation can be
achieved. For example, some NoC architectures use determin-
istic routing [14], meaning that there is only one possible route
between a source and a destination, effectively preventing the
approach proposed here. Among NoCs supporting dynamic or
adaptive routing, which are the ones we target, there is a key
design choice affecting the randomisation approach: source or
distributed routing.
In source-routed NoCs, the routing decision is done by the
source core or its respective NI. This is usually implemented
as multiple packet header flits that contain the next-hop
information for each of the switches along the packet’s route.
Once a switch routes one of the packet headers by assigning
its output port, it discards that header flit and forwards the rest
of the packet through that port. The next switch will route the
subsequent header flit, discard it, forward the rest of the packet,
and this is repeated all the way towards the packet destination.
By following this approach, it is possible to program the source
core or its NI to perform full route randomisation before every
packet release.
In NoCs with distributed routing, the next-hop decision is
made by each switch individually. Typically, they have far
less resources than the cores (and often than the NIs), so
the routing decisions are based on simple rules related to
the relative position of the destination core with regards to
the switch holding the packet header (e.g. pseudo-adaptive
XY [4], turn model [7]). In those cases, it is only possible
to randomly choose from a predefined subset of all possible
routes. For instance, pseudo-adaptive XY switches can only
randomly choose between two routes between a source and
a destination (e.g. routes between cores A and B in Figure
1). Switches implementing turn model routing may have a
larger number of alternative routes to randomly choose from in
most cases, but must behave deterministically for some specific
cases. Figure 1 shows two routes created by a west-first turn
model: packets between core C and D have only one possible
route, as the destination is located on the west of the source,
while packets from core C to E can take a variety of possible
routes.
In both source and distributed routing, the NoC component
making random decisions must have access to a source of ran-
dom data, such as a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG,
generated by a deterministic algorithm) or a true random
number generator (TRNG, often generated out of low level
noise signals). Such sources can have significant hardware
overhead, thus favouring source routing because of the low
area constraints for NoC switches. For the route randomisation
approaches reviewed above, however, overheads should be
minimal in either case as they only require random sources
with one-bit output.
Additional issues when randomising packet routes include
the potential increase of the packet route, the possibility of
deadlocks, and the potential increase of packet latency (and
therefore the potential violation of real-time constraints). Let
us now address each of them.
All the routing approaches reviewed above are minimal: the
route they choose has the smallest possible hop count between
source and destination. This is because of their obvious
advantages in terms of latency, network contention and energy
dissipation. However, from the point of view of side-channel
attack resilience, it may be interesting to exploit non-minimal
randomised routing in order to decorrelate the side channels
with the functional properties of the packet communication
(e.g. short packet transmission between neighbouring cores
would not necessarily have the shortest latency and lowest
energy dissipation if they are forced to take a long route across
the chip).
Deadlock-free packet communication is a critical character-
istic for NoCs. This can be achieved at the link arbitration
layer, e.g. with priority-preemptive virtual channels [10], or
at the network layer by restricting the possible turns of the
routing algorithm (either in source or in distributed routing).
In NoCs that ensure deadlock-freeness at the network layer,
special care must be taken by the route randomisation ap-
proach to avoid introducing turns that can lead to deadlocks.
Finally, route randomisation is likely to change the laten-
cies of packets, both because for every release their routes
may have different hop counts (leading to different no-load
latencies) and because different routes may trigger different
contention scenarios (leading to different blocking times). In
our approach, such variability is actually desirable because
it is a key aspect to increasing the NoC’s resilience against
side channel attacks. In the case of hard real-time systems,
however, it is critical that such variability is bounded and that
the worst-case latencies of all packets are always less than their
deadlines. In the next subsection, we propose an extension to
existing schedulability analysis to evaluate if that is the case
for a given application mapped to a given NoC architecture.
The proposed approach is simple, yet general enough to
analyse randomised routing approaches following any of the
design choices reviewed above: source or distributed, minimal
or non-minimal, and with deadline-freeness ensured at the link
or network layer.
B. Schedulability Analysis
Schedulability analysis for a set of sporadic packets trans-
ferred over a priority-preemptive wormhole switching NoC
was presented in [27]. A set of packets is deemed schedulable
if the worst-case latency of each packet is less than their dead-
line. By coupling that analysis with classical response time
analysis for uniprocessor fixed-priority scheduling, an end-to-
end schedulability analysis for that type of NoC was proposed
in [10], considering the worst-case response times of tasks
and the worst-case latency of the packets they generate. Both
the original analysis from [27] and the end-to-end extension
from [10] assume static routing, so a different formulation is
needed before it can be used for the purpose of this paper.
First, we review those formulations, but using the notation
described in subsection III-D.
According to [27], the worst-case latency Si of a packet
φi can be obtained from Equation 1. This equation is defined
recursively and iterated until a stable fixed point is discovered.
Si = Li +
∑
φj∈interf(i)
⌈
Si +Kj +K
I
j
Tj
⌉
Lj , (1)
The set interf(i) is the set of higher priority packets φj
whose route shares at least one link with the route of φi
and therefore can interfere with it. Precisely, interf(i) =
{φj ∈ φ : map(φi) ∩ map(φj) 6= ∅}. The two terms Kj
and KIj denote respectively the maximum release jitter of the
interfering packet φj and its maximum indirect interference
jitter. As shown in [10], Kj is equal to the worst case response
time Rj of task τj which produces φj , assuming that φj will
be released immediately after the end of τj’s execution. Rj
can be calculated using uniprocessor response time analysis,
considering the type of task scheduling by the operating
system at each core (e.g. priority-preemptive). And as shown
in [27], the indirect interference jitter KIj can be bound by
Sj − Lj .
It can be seen in Equation 1 that the route of a packet
affects its worst-case latency because it defines the set of
packets that can add to the interference term of the equation
(i.e. sum operator). Route randomisation would change the set
interf(i) at each packet release, since different routes would
produce different interference patterns. An intuitive way to find
the worst-case latency of a packet with a randomised route
would be to calculate the worst-case latency of each of its
possible routes with Equation 1, and pick the highest value.
However, that approach works only if there is a single packet
with randomised route, and all others following deterministic
routes.
A general analysis where all packets could potentially have
randomised routes is more complex: all possible routes of
a packet would have to be tested with all possible routes
of all other packets before the worst case could be found.
Furthermore, if one cannot make probabilistic assumptions on
the randomisation approach, pathological cases must also be
taken into account (e.g. the same route could be chosen again
and again for a single packet over a long period of time, even
though that is very unlikely).
In this paper we assume that, in the worst case, if there is a
way for a high-priority packet to interfere with a low priority
packet, it would interfere with it in every possible release. This
means that even though there may be routes when packets do
not interfere with each other, we assume that in the worst case
the random choice of route would always pick the ones where
there is interference. This is perfectly reasonable when packets
have similar periods, but it gets more and more pessimistic
as we reduce the periods of higher priority packets. In that
case, high priority packets would have a larger number of
releases within a single release of a low priority packet, thus
interfering more often with it, even though the larger number
of releases would make less likely that an interfering route
would be chosen every time.
To calculate worst-case latencies for the general problem
where all packets could have randomised routes, we define
the set interfr(i) as the set of higher priority packets φj
who could, with any of their possible routes, interfere with
any of the possible routes of the packet of interest φi. To
precisely define that set, we must first define a new function
router(pia, pib) = {λa1, λ12, λ13, λ14, . . . , λmb}, denoting the
subset of Λ that contains all the links that could be part
of any of the routes that could be randomly chosen to
transfer packets from core pia to core pib, and a new function
mapr(φi) = router(map(τi),map(τd)). Then, interfr(i) =
{φj ∈ φ : mapr(φi) ∩mapr(φj) 6= ∅}.
By applying Equation 1 with the summation over the set
interfr(i) instead of the original interf(i), we can then
find an upper bound to the packet latencies over a NoC with
randomised routing.
C. Optimising the Performance-Security Trade-off
The schedulability analysis proposed in the previous subsec-
tion can only be used to test whether a particular randomised
NoC configuration can meet the hard real-time constraints of
an application. It offers no alternatives in case of negative
results, i.e. when performance constraints are not met. In
this subsection we show how the schedulability test can be
exploited as a fitness function in a design space exploration
process. Similarly to [20] and [10], we follow an evolutionary
approach to navigate over a key part of the design space: task-
core mapping. By changing that mapping, it is possible to
achieve fine-grained improvements on schedulability of tasks
over cores and packet flows over NoC infrastructure (e.g.
tasks that are barely unschedulable can become schedulable
by a simple remapping of one of the higher priority tasks
that interfere with their computation or communication, thus
changing the set interf in Equation 1). The same can happen
in the case of route randomisation, since changes on mapping
can determine which randomised routes interfere with each
other and in turn affect schedulability through changes in the
interfr set.
Figure 2 shows the evolutionary pipeline proposed here,
which start with an arbitrary population of task mappings
using a given route randomisation approach and a given
level of security. It then uses evolutionary operators such as
mutation and crossover to improve the mapping population
with regards to the percentage of schedulable tasks and packets
calculated using the proposed modification of Equation 1.
For every generation of the population, those with the larger
number of schedulable tasks and packets are selected to the
next generation, where they will be again mutated, crossed-
over, evaluated and selected to the subsequent generation. The
pipeline stops after a fully schedulable mapping is found, or
a predefined maximum number of generations is reached.
Unlike many constructive task mapping approaches, the
evolutionary pipeline proposed here does not necessarily try
to map communicating tasks to the same or neighbouring
cores. Its fitness function can be tuned, for instance, to keep
communicating tasks as far apart as possible while keeping
their communication packets schedulable over a variety of
randomly-chosen routes.
In this paper, we consider two types of route randomisation
which can be implemented either as source or distributed
routing, namely random XY/YX and random west-first. Ran-
dom XY/YX is a randomised version of pseudo-adaptive XY
routing used in [4], so the route of the packet to its destination
is randomly chosen between the XY or the YX route prior
to the injection of the packet header into the network. In
random west-first, we randomise one of the turn model routing
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Fig. 2: Evolutionary pipeline to optimise performance-security
trade-off
approaches [7] so that whenever a packet is allowed more
than one route it randomly chooses one of them (i.e. uniform
probability among all alternatives).
We then allow for multiple levels of security by changing
how many packet flows are allowed to have their routes
randomised. A baseline with no randomisation should have
the best results regarding schedulability, given that packets
suffer less interference and therefore are more likely to be
schedulable. Then, increased levels of security can be achieved
by randomised larger percentages of packet flows, up to a fully
randomised configuration where all packets follow randomised
routes on every release. In the next section, we show experi-
mentally that the proposed schedulability test and evolutionary
optimisation pipeline can produce NoC configurations able
to hold hard real-time guarantees with maximised security
potential.
V. EXPERIMENTAL WORK
We evaluate the proposed approach in two distinct ex-
perimental setups. The first uses the proposed schedulability
test and evolutionary pipeline to balance the trade-off be-
tween performance guarantees and security over a large set
of synthetically generated applications. The second uses a
cycle-accurate NoC simulator to show the effects of route
randomisation upon latency with a realistic application.
A. Schedulability-driven optimisation of route randomisation
This section presents the workflow for analytic schedula-
bility evaluation, and evolution with an evolutionary pipeline
based on a genetic algorithm (GA). It follows the pipeline
presented in Figure 2. To evaluate the challenge of optimising
different applications with different levels of load, we syn-
thetically generate thousands of applications, each of them
composed of tasks that communicate with each other with dif-
ferent numbers of packet flows. We then apply the evolutionary
pipeline to each one of those applications, aiming to optimise
the mappings of tasks in such a way that the whole set of
tasks and flows is schedulable at different levels of security.
We then plot the percentage of schedulable applications we
could achieve for each level of security and each level of load.
For the sake of reproducibility, we provide below more details
on the whole process.
For a single experiment upon a given NoC and set of
parameters (e.g. topology, operating frequency, switch and
link latencies), a range of packet flow counts are identified,
each of which represents a level of communication within the
application, and therefore a utilisation load upon the NoC. For
each flow count chosen for experimental evaluation, a set of
tasksets and packet flowsets are generated, each containing the
chosen number of flows. The number of tasks is kept roughly
constant, and all of them are either source or destination
of at least one packet flow. Therefore, flowsets with higher
flow counts represent increasing packet contention between
the same endpoints. Flows are assigned to particular source
and destination tasks with uniform random probability. This
implies that the average number of flows transmitted is even
across all tasks, although as a result of the random assignment
there may be unique hotspots.
Following this, an experiment is initialised by defining a
population of initial mappings, and a setting for the target
level of security case setting. The levels of security settings
are defined as either unsecured, or 25%, 50%, 75% and 100%
secured flows. The secured flows are those that will use
randomised routing, providing increased potential protection
against side-channel attacks. In case of a partial provision
of security e.g. 50%, security is assigned to the flows in
their order of priority, with the highest priority flows being
randomised. The rationale is to enforce overall random in-
terference patterns, since higher priority packets are the ones
causing interference.
A population of chromosomes (each representing of a
mapping of tasks to cores upon the NoC, as shown in the
upper-left corner of Figure 2) is specified for each level of load
(i.e. synthetically generated taskset and flowset with a specific
flow count). A genetic algorithm is then used to evolve these
chromosomes, performing mutation, crossover and evaluation
of the population according to a fitness function based on the
modified Equation 1. This is done separately for each level
of security, each of them generating a different interfr(i) set
representing the randomised routes of different packet flows.
By applying the modified Equation 1 for every packet flow
of the application, it is possible to check whether each of
them is schedulable, i.e. their end-to-end latency is less than
the respective deadline. The overall fitness of an application is
then assumed to be the number of schedulable packet flows.
Following the fitness function evaluation, the population is
culled to retain only the chromosomes that are at the top of
the fitness ranking. If the fitness function indicates that the
top-ranked chromosome represents a mapping where all flows
are schedulable, then the GA terminates early. Otherwise,
following the completion of the chromosome improvement
process at a fixed number of generations, the best chromosome
(output mapping) and schedulability obtained (both aggregate
flows and flowsets) is output for display.
NoC/Packet flowset parameters Value
Maximum packet flow no-load latency 100 ms
Maximum period 500 ms
Priority assignment Deadline monotonic
Route randomisation Random XY/YX
Standard NoC topology 4x4
Enlarged NoC topology 8x8
Flowsets per data point 100
GA parameters
Population size 100
Mutation individual task moving probability 0.3
Maximum generations 50
TABLE I: Evaluation parameters
To show the impact of the level of security on performance
guarantees and resource usage, we have produced several
experimental series:
No security (NS) Deterministic routing, fitness function in-
corporates schedulability calculated using Equation 1
with the original interf(i) set.
Percentage security (PS(%)) A given percentage of the
packet flows use randomised routing, fitness function
evaluated using Equation 1 with the proposed interfr(i)
set reflecting that percentage.
Application of security a posteriori (SAP) Evolution
is performed using a fitness function that tests the
schedulability without any security mechanisms (only
deterministic routing), aiming to find a schedulable
mapping without security considerations. Following the
completion of this evolutionary process, the evolved
best application mapping has 100% of its packet routes
randomised, and is then evaluated with Equation 1 with
the proposed interfr(i) set. This experiment therefore
aims to show that the optimisation of the mapping should
take into account route randomisation, and that poor
results can be expected from applying randomisation to
a mapping that was optimised for deterministic routing.
1) Results: Figure 3 shows the aggregate schedulability of
flows after improvement with the GA, as a mean proportion
across all flowsets generated for that data point. It is clear that
the ordering of the results series in the illustrated plot follows
the proportion of security provided, with an increasing number
of flows in the flowsets (and therefore an increasing load upon
the NoC) providing a slight reduction in schedulability of the
evolved cases. This is as anticipated, in that the worst-case
schedulability analysis would be affected by the increased in-
terference present from the optional random routes. However,
since each GA run is an independent evolutionary process, the
ordering of the series does not always follow the anticipated
order. In the SAP series (security a posteriori), evolution is
performed using a fitness function that tested schedulability
under the no security case (XY routing). However, following
the completion of the GA the evolved mapping schedulability
was evaluated with all flows using randomised routing. As
anticipated, the schedulability of SAP is considerably worse
than the NS or PS series, since the evolution was performed
using a routing strategy that assumes lower interference than
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Fig. 3: Flow schedulability results in the 4x4 case
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Fig. 4: Flowset schedulability results in the 4x4 case
the final evaluation case. Figure 4 shows the schedulability of
flowsets. A flowset is only considered schedulable if every
flow within it is schedulable. The results follow the same
general trend as in Figure 3, although they reach zero earlier
since flowset schedulability requires every component flow to
be schedulable.
For the 8x8 example evaluation case, the results are pre-
sented in Figures 5 and 6. The results show a greater separation
between the NS and PS series after NoC evolution, due to the
increased NoC size and number of flows allowing a greater
complexity of interference graphs when randomised routing is
enabled. The SAP case also has significantly lower schedula-
bility, since its evolved mapping was obtained without rout-
ing randomisation and imposing randomisation later affects
schedulability. In the schedulability of flowsets in Figure 6, it
is clear there is a wider difference in schedulability between
the PS(100) secured case and NS (no security) particularly
in flowsets with 70 to 85 flows. This illustrates that as the
interference graph becomes more complex it is harder for the
GA to find schedulable mappings.
B. Cycle-accurate simulation of route randomisation
One of the key concerns in altering network routing is the
impact that it will have upon latency for packet transmission,
particularly in latency-sensitive real time applications. This
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Fig. 5: Flow schedulability results in the 8x8 case
20 40 60 80 100 120 140
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Flow count
Pr
op
ort
ion
 of
 sc
he
du
lab
le 
flo
ws
ets
Flowset schedulability after improvement using a GA
under various routing strategies − 100 flowsets per data point
 
 
No security − (NS)
25% random − PS(25)
50% random − PS(50)
75% random − PS(75)
100% random − PS(100)
Security a posteriori − SAP
Fig. 6: Flowset schedulability results in the 8x8 case
section considers via simulation the impact of randomising of
the routing protocol on the latency of a previously published
real-time application case, the autonomous vehicle application
[10].
The simulation framework used for this section is a cycle-
accurate NoC model with support for priority preemption and
virtual channels. This simulator has been extensively validated
in our previous work, frequently being used as a baseline for
results in latency and power analysis [11] [8].
1) Application Structure: The application used in this ap-
plication is an autonomous vehicle (AV) application [10]. This
application consists of 38 communicating flows between a set
of tasks that represent video processing, system monitoring
and control for a robotic vehicle. As is the convention through-
out this paper, priorities are defined such that lower priority
index values represent the highest priority transmissions. The
priorities, data transmission rates, frequencies and deadlines of
these application transmissions are as defined in [10], although
a different mapping has been used in order to show the impact
of routing protocols on a randomly selected mapping without
artificial tuning to favour a particular routing protocol. The
application has been mapped onto a 4x3 NoC, and the video
resolution of the AV application video streams is 640x480.
Since the application mapping is static and a single priority
level is used per packet, a packet always travels between a
fixed source-destination pair during the simulation.
2) Routing Alternatives: In this simulation evaluation, two
routing alternatives incorporating randomisation are used, in
addition to the baseline comparison of XY routing. The first
routing alternative uses the XY/YX approach. In this approach,
traffic producers determine uniformly randomly on injection
whether a data packet will use XY or YX routing, and
following this decision a flag is set in the data packet to control
the routing behaviour. As a result, the chosen routing algorithm
(either XY or YX) is used throughout packet transmission.
In addition, an alternative routing structure known as ran-
dom west first (RWF) routing is also implemented, which
allows randomised routing decisions to be taken by individual
arbiters during data transmission. RWF requires the packet
always be forwarded towards the west when the destination
node is west of the current arbiter. However, any other
destination port can be chosen uniformly randomly (east,
north or south) as long as the direction taken is towards
the destination. Therefore, the RWF approach permits a more
diverse range of transmission paths than the XY/YX selection
approach, providing more potential protection against side
channel attacks.
3) Evaluation Results: The results are presented in Figures
7 and 8, illustrating the max-min-mean latencies and nor-
malised latencies for the randomised routing cases (XY/YX
and RWF) versus the baseline. Normalised latency is calcu-
lated by dividing the end-to-end latency of the packets by the
packet size, which provides a metric of latency per flit. This
metric is therefore more sensitive to delays in the transmission
of short packets.
The latency results presented in Figure 7 illustrate that
routing randomisation typically increases the communication
latencies for the majority of packets compared to fixed XY
routing. This is particularly evident in the case of the packets
with priority 8 under RWF routing, which experience an
increased latency due to contention with other higher priority
flows on some of the randomly chosen routes. In the XY/YX
routing case, increased latency is also observed for the packets
with priorities 21 and 26 in some cases. Interestingly, for some
of the packet transmissions with priority 10 and 13, the use of
randomised routing is also to reduce latency in the best case,
either by routing a higher priority packet so that it no longer
causes interference, or routing the current packet around the
interferer.
Considering the normalised latency results in Figure 8, it is
clear that the relative impact of route randomisation is most
significant upon packets with priorities 13, 15, 18 and 26.
These transmissions represent some of the shortest packets in
the system, which are therefore more greatly impacted on a
relative basis by contention with other packets. As depicted in
the previous figure, some priority 13 packets encounter a large
reduction in latency during some transmissions as a result of
avoiding interference.
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Fig. 7: Communication latency results for the randomised
routing case on the AV application
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper has addressed the trade-off between security and
hard real-time performance guarantees in Networks-on-Chip.
It has proposed route randomisation as a way to increase NoC
resilience against side-channel attacks, and has discussed a
number of design alternatives for the randomisation approach.
It then has proposed a schedulability test for applications
running over a secure priority-preemptive NoCs using route
randomisation. Finally, the paper identifies an optimisation
pipeline which can be guided by the proposed schedulability
test towards configurations that can achieve full schedulability
while maximising the provided level of security. Extensive
experimental work using 4x4 and 8x8 NoCs with random
XY/YX routing running thousands of synthetically generated
applications show the performance guarantees that can be
achieved by the proposed approach at four different levels
of security, compared against two baselines (no security, and
full security applied a posteriori). Additional experiments with
a realistic application running over 4x3 NoCs with random
XY/YX and random west-first routing were performed with a
cycle-accurate simulator, aiming to show the impact of route
randomisation on latency variability, which in turn shows the
increased resilience against side-channel attacks.
Since this is the first paper addressing the trade-off between
security and hard real-time performance in NoCs, it had to
make several assumptions to be able to attack the problem.
Lifting some of those assumptions will certainly open new
avenues of research, such as using different NoC arbitration
mechanisms (e.g. TDM) or different route randomisation tech-
niques (e.g. if randomised routes of subsequent releases of
packets are never the same, a less pessimistic schedulability
test can be used). Addressing those cases will require new
schedulability tests, but could still reuse the proposed optimi-
sation pipeline.
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